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Extractive Versus Productive Economy: A Case
Study Comparison of Peru and South Korea
Ruben Berrios
There are striking contrasts between a productive and an extractive economy. South
Korea and Peru are used as examples. Korea is not a resource-rich country but has developed remarkably fast. Pem, on the other hand, is a resource-rich country but has
shown uneven rates of growth and has had a lackluster development performance because it has relied on extractive industries that have brought boom and bust. Korea is a
high performing economy that achieved high rates of growth im plementing policies
that emphasized productivity and promoted industrialization and free trade. Korea's
success is explained in terms of its policies promoting the growth of private manufacturing industries, technological planning, strong support for education, investment initiatives, and socio-cultural factors. Peru, on the other hand, still suffers from structural
weaknesses . This article calls for Peru to put in place a viable development model, invest in human capital , industrial development, and promote nontraditional exports.

A priority of development is to promote sustained economic growth, achieve prosperity, and compete internationally. Many studies have shown that the best tool to combat
poverty is to accelerate economic growth. Countries with positive income growth have
experienced a decline in the proportion of people living in poverty. It is estimated that
on average, with a 1% increase in GDP per capita, poverty is reduced by 7%. This
paper argues that there are striking contrasts between a productive economy and an
extractive economy. Some Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea (commonly
known as South Korea) are not resource-rich countries but have developed remarkably
fast. Peru, on the other hand, is a resource-rich country but has shown uneven rates of
growth and has stagnated in its development efforts. This case study comparison of
Peru and Korea attempts to show how the former has lagged behind while the latter has
achieved rapid progress toward development.
South Korea is chosen as an example of a productive economy and Peru as an
example of an extractive economy. Both countries share some broad common features
but have followed different trajectories of development. The central argument is that
Peru has had a lackluster development performance because it has relied on extractive
industries that have generated insufficient employment and sluggish growth. Its development policies were often ineffective. Meanwhile Korea became a high performing
economy that achieved high rates of growth by implementing the right policies that
emphasized increases in productivity and promoted an outward-orientation to industrialization and trade.
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Two Paths Taken
Figure 1 shows the starting point of comparison between the countries based on GDP
per capita since 1960. The initial conditions defined broadly (including per capita income levels and other quantitative characteristics) were similar, but they pursued
somewhat different policies and achieved different economic outcomes. The figure
shows that in 1960 Peru 's GDP per capita was actually higher than Korea's. The latter
was able to catch up by 1970. Korea 's GDP per capita shows a steep upward trend
while Peru 's GDP per capita growth has remained flat for the past four decades. In a
matter of 20 years Korea had surpassed not only Peru but the rest of Latin America.

Figure 1: GDP Per Capita of Peru and Korea (Constant 2000 US$
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Peru 's overall performance since the 1960s has been less dynamic and somewhat
uneven. Per capita income growth remained relatively flat. During the 1980s Peru
experienced the "lost decade" due to high levels of foreign debt and low levels of
growth. However, in the period from 1960 to 1999, Korea had moved from being an
agricultural nation to becoming a prominent new industrializing country (NIC). By the
year 2000, Korea was ranked 12th in the world economy in terms ofGDP. The contrast
can be seen using the most common measures for income and output comparisons, the
GDP, including average annual growth, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita growth.
Countries with a high GDP per capita have a lot of physical and human capital that is
organized using technological knowledge to be more productive. "High quality
growth" can be defined as growth that is sustainable, brings lasting gains in employ-
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ment and living standards, and reduces poverty. This has been achieved by Korea but
not so much for Peru. These comparati ve figures are evident in Table I

Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators
GDP US$
(millions)

Average
Annual
Growth
(%)

Population
(millions)

Population
Growth

GNP
Per
capita

GDP
Per
capita

GDP
per
capi ta
growth

1970

20 11

1990

2010

20 11

8099

200009

2009

2010

200009

KOREA

252,622

1, 11 6,247

9.4

6.2

48.4

1.5

0.3

27, 100

29,004

3.8

PERU

32,802

176,662

-0.3

8.8

29.4

2.0

1. 1

8,629

9,538

4.1

Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report, various years; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook,
various years; The World Bank, 2012

The argument that reliance on extractive industries is not necessarily conducive to
economic growth has been made previously. Research on the subject has stressed that
on average resource-rich countries have slower growth (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001;
Auty, 2001). However, research by Davis (2009) and other studies show that the evidence is mixed regarding the relationship between the extractive intensity of economic
activity and the level of economic growth. Davis claims that some economies with a
substantial extractive sector have achieved higher levels of development. However,
there is the recognition that extractive economies suffer from the eros ion effect of
resource wealth and the structural shift reduces manufacturing employment.
In order to transform a developing economy, it is necessary to set up the right mix
of institutions and policies capable of generating economic success. Korea' s pragmatic
policy approach and the ability of the government to perform institutional, technical,
administrative, and political functions created opportunities for economic development.
Korea was able to sustain high levels of growth, high rates of investment, macroeconomic stability, an adequate regulatory system, a responsible political and entrepreneurial class, provide strong support for education to generate high levels of human
capital, and incorporate technological innovation (Amsden, 198 9; Breen, 1999; Koo,
1992; Leon, 2003; Song, 1997; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
Also relevant for growth and development are factors such as securing private
property rights, the degree of economic freedom and competitiveness, the degree of
corruption, and the ease of doing business. These factors foster a better business environment. Table 2 shows that Korea is ranked very high in terms of global competitiveness. Korea is also ranked much higher than Peru in terms of economic freedom because of its more inclusive economic environment. The same is true for respect of
property rights and the ease of doing business.
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Table 2: Comparative Business Indicators

KOREA
PERU

Competitive
Environment

Economic
Freedom

Level of
Corruption

Respect of
Property
Rights

Out of 81
countries
24th
67th

Out of 156
countries
31st
42nd

Out of 54
countries
43rd
80th

Out of 129
countries
38th
76th

Cost of
Complying
with Bureaucracy
Out of 183
countries
8th
41st

Sources: !.The Global Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2012; 2. The Hetitage
Foundation, Index ofEconomic Freedom, 2012; 3. Tranparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 20 12; 4. International Property Rights Index, 2012 Report; 5. The World Bank,
Ease ofDoing Business Rank, 2012.

Degree of Comparison
Although Peru ' s geographic area is 12 times larger than Korea's (1,285,000 sq. km. vs.
99,000 sq. km.), the latter 's population is almost twice as large (29 million vs. 49 million) . Historically both countries had been colonized. Peru achieved independence from
Spain in 1823 and Korea was liberated from Japanese imperial domination in 1945. In
terms of resource endowment, Peru is rich in minerals, agricultural production, and
fishing resources. Its exports consist mainly of minerals, agricultural products from the
coastal region, and fish and fish products. Korea lacks such a rich natural resource
base, but it has more human resources than Peru. Peru is more racially diverse while
Korea is homogeneous. Both countries have open economies and rely heavily on external trade. Korea, however, has been more outward-oriented and has become a strong
competitor in world markets of manufactured goods, automobiles, steel, and shipbuilding. On the relative importance of the public and private sectors, Korea has a larger
private sector.
Both countries rapidly urbanized over the course of the past five decades. In 2010,
72% of Peru ' s population lived in urban centers while 82% of Korea's population was
urban. In terms of occupational activity, both countries have seen the manufacturing
and services sectors grow the fastest while the importance of agriculture as a source of
labor has diminished . Korea rapidly accelerated the growth of manufacturing output
and by 201 0, manufacturing accounted for 45 % of GOP . The Korean economy is now
a predominantly industrial and service-oriented economy. For Peru, the composition of
GOP for industry was only 30% (World Bank, 2012). A significant social byproduct of
Korea' s successful development is the rise of a large middle class that is enjoying a
newfound consumerism. The same cannot be said of Peru, where the middle class is a
small percentage of the population.
Both countries have also relied on foreign aid. Relative to the rest of Latin America, Peru has been a large recipient of foreign development assistance from rich countries for years. Korea received generous sums of aid particularly from the United States
during the 1960s, but for the past two decades Korea has become a foreign aid donor.
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Interestingly enough, Korea has been providing development assistance to Peru since
the 1990s.
The "initial conditions" defined broadly include not only the factor endowments
we alluded to but also the institutional and organizational factors . Both Korea and Peru
started their post-war economic development with an inward-oriented strategy to industrialization. This is what is known as import substitution industrialization (lSI),
which is a development strategy that governments adopted, where domestic production
substitutes for some imported goods. lSI begins with the production of relatively simple non-durable consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, and canned goods. For the lSI
strategy to work, the pattern of domestic production and exports must be altered and
promoted by the state through the exclusion of foreign competition, bank credit, preferential rates for essential inputs, and specific tax exemptions (Cypher and Dietz,
2004).

Essential Characteristics of an Extractive Economy
Extractive economies are those that physically remove resources from their environment primarily for exporting. Although there are potential economic benefits to resource extraction, there are also shortcomings. For instance, mining is assumed to be a
powerful stimulus for the economy in generating foreign exchange earnings, but it is
also relatively unstable owing to fluctuating commodity prices, the depletion of deposits, the impact of global competition, and frequent labor-management disputes. For
many years in countries like Peru and Bolivia the mining sector has been the economic
engine driving the rest of the economy.
Extractive industries can contribute significantly to a country ' s economic development by generating employment, foreign exchange, and government revenues. But
they also can become a source of rent-seeking, oan be poorly managed, and can result
in excessive reliance on the extractive resource. In Peru's case, income resulting from
unstable world prices has brought limited prosperity for the regions where the mines
are located. A similar pattern is experienced in other sectors where lumber, fish, oil,
and other commodities are exported usually raw or unfinished . The producing countries are denied the commodities' additional values, which in the end would benefit the
core economies (Bunker, 1984; Liebenthal et a!. , 2005). However, in recent years the
emergence of China has resulted in higher demand for commodities, which has led to a
rise in commodity prices.
A key feature of extractive economies is their susceptibility to external shocks.
Unfavorable price shifts lead to uneven terms of trade. Prebisch (1950) has warned that
the specialization in primary goods, over time, leads to a deteriorating tendency on the
terms of trade for primary producers relative to manufactured goods produced in industrialized nations. When this happens it triggers a decline in government revenues and
the government is forced to seek foreign borrowing. Reliance on primary exports also
makes the country more dependent because it misses the opportunity to diversify into
more nontraditional goods with higher value added .
Rich natural resource endowment has been a blessing for some countries and did
translate into increased prosperity (e.g, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway). But
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in many less developed countries (LDCs) rich in resources, it has in some cases become a "curse" (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Sachs, 2005; Davis & Tilton, 2005). Empirical
evidence suggests that on average resource-abundant economies of the less developed
world have not performed well relative to those countries that are resource-deficient
(Auty, 200 I) .
Peru once had a silver and guano boom and "bonanza" development through resource extraction, but there has been a sequence of unsuccessful outcomes following
every resource boom. Another case is the fishing industry (abundant in the 1950s and
60s) which suffered a precipitous decline as a result of climate change, over-fishing,
and government policy failures. Schuldt (2005) has noted that the country's poverty is
the consequence of its natural wealth. This is what some scholars term the paradox of
plenty (Karl, 1997). But this is not something that is inevitable because development
trajectories can be altered.
Peru has remained an extractive economy since the colonial period. The process of
commodity extraction responded to international demand. But excessive demand at
various points in time and a short-term profit mentality on the part of the domestic elite
contributed to a depletion of resources. Furthermore, lack of adequate planning and
vision distorted the structure of the economy and failed to bring about development
(Moron & Sanborn, 2006; Schuldt, 2005). Increased dependence on export commodities has also set limitations on opportunities for technological innovation. Moreover,
these raw commodities are likely to lose their utility when the extractive resource is
depleted, when international demand changes, or when cheaper substitutes are found.
This type of resource-dependent economy, also known as "enclave economy" has been
well documented (Levin, 1960; Thorp & Bertram, 1978: Bunker, 1984). As an extractive economy, Peru 's development performance based on Human Development Index
and other socio-economic and business indicators so far has been disappointing.
As Bunker notes, "the crucial difference between production and extraction is that
the dynamics of scale function inversely to the dynamics on the productive economies
to which world trade connects them" ( 1984, p. I 056). In a productive economy the
forces of production develop progressively because the unit cost of production tends to
fall as the scale of production increases. However, extractive economies respond to
increased external demand and tend to impoverish themselves by exploiting those
resources beyond their capacity for regeneration, thereby forcing the per-unit cost of
commodities to rise.
While two centuries ago natural resources might have been a source of wealth,
oday the wealth of nations comes mainly from ideas embedded in new technologies.
Raw materials are no longer a guarantee to progress, and in fact, many cases show they
are the road to failure. Nearly half a century ago raw materials constituted about 30%
of the world 's total output but today it is about 4%. Much of the world economy today
· concentrated in services and manufacturing. At present a number of LDCs are nego·ating free trade agreements and better commercial relations with the United States and
Europe, but this means that these countries are investing their energy in trying to get
tter terms on this small slice of the world economy (Oppenheimer, 2005).
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The Development Experience
Peru over the past half a century has expanded its exports and diversified them, but it
remains predominantly a primary commodity exporter. Despite its resources and aid
received, Peru failed to attain development, has witnessed many fai led projects, and
has suffered from the symptoms of policy-induced distortions. At the end of the mi llennium, 43.3 % of Peru ' s exports were primary products, while Korea ' s were only
1.3%. The expansion of Peru 's primary exports in recent years has led to higher levels
of economic growth but with increasing inequality.
Korea, on the other hand, was able to achieve exceptional growth and success in
expanding manufacturing exports since the 1960s. The contrast in economic performance between South Korea and Peru is the most glaring after the first oil shock of
1973-74. Korea's real GDP expanded 8.9% per annum, compared to a mere 1% in
Peru. Rapid economic growth was supported by a sharp expansion of exports that bolstered investment (Lin, 1988). By contrast, Peru's exports had a sluggish growth. It is
only in recent years that Peru has posted higher levels of growth due to increased demand for commodities by countries like China. On the whole, Peru has had an erratic
path to economic development and was at times plagued by balance of payments deficits, chronic inflation, and a growing foreign debt (Sheahan, 1999; Wise, 2003).
As development strategies, import substitution and export orientation are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Import substitution can be divided into an easy stage,
where non-durable goods are produced, and a more advanced stage, where consumer
durables and capital goods are produced. Export orientation also requ ires a stage of
exporting manufactured products that is more labor intensive and a more advanced
stage that requires more capital and is more technology-intensive (Chen, 1989; Cypher
& Dietz 2004; Todaro & Smith, 2006). Korea went from the early stage of ISI to export substitution. The policy change was aimed at promoting export incentives. This
was accomplished with the devaluation of the won, restrictions on imports, tariffs, and
tax concessions on inputs by exporting firms, and export credit subsidies. By 1980,
about one-third of Korea ' s exports were made up of manufactured exports. Korea was
able to move rapidly from easy import-substitution industrialization strategy in the
beginning of the 1960s into a stage of export substitution. Peru, on the other hand,
became stuck at an intermediate point and faced setbacks on the more capital-intensive
industries (Beaulne, 1975; Pease, 1981; Wise, 2003).
Korean export expansion thrived on its industrial efficiency. Peru, on the other
hand, lacked political continuity and the necessary policy reforms to advance industrial
development. Korea generated an extensive system of export incentives that were
extended over the years . Although Peru did promote nontraditional exports in the
1970s and 80s, the incentives system was inconsistent and at times biased against
exports. Korea's efforts were successful because once economic reforms were
implemented they were fully supported by successive policy makers and the direction
of reforms did not change over time. By contrast, policy reform in Peru fluctuated and
there was a lack of consensus leading to policy shifts with subsequent administrations
(Moron & Sanborn, 2006; Wise, 2003).
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As a late industrializer there was not much state-sponsored industrial strategy in
Peru until the 1960s, and this was mostly an export-supporting activity influenced by
foreign capital. During this period Peru was a primary exporter and was in the
consumer durable stage of lSI relying on protectionism (Beaulne, 1975). The state was
passively involved in increasing its role in the economy. The National Planning
Institute (INP) was created in 1962. Although Peru 's economy became increasingly
dependent on fishmeal and copper as the biggest foreign exchange earners, the
manufacturing sector was growing rapidly and by 1965 it came to account for 20% of
GDP. In terms of export growth, manufacturing was only second to fishmeal. But
behind this, the lSI drive had its classic pitfalls. For instance, over half of the output
was under foreign control, one-fourth of it was related to the processing of primary
products, and a significant portion of production was assembly operations for foreign
firms (Wise, 2003).
During the late 1960s and early '70s Peru assumed a more conscious effort to
industrialize. The state intervened more actively in the economy. This was evident with
the nationalization of basic industries, the creation of the Ministry of Industry, and the
passing of the General Law oflnpustry in 1970. Although priority was given to local
industry the state-sponsored model ran out of steam quickly. In 1975 there was a retreat
and by 1980 the same old politicians representing the Lima elite were back in power
promoting a variation of a more market based approach without much government
involvement.
In Peru, as in many countries in Latin America, protection was prolonged rather
than phased out. Easy lSI should be seen simply as a first step on the path to industrialization. But industrialization must go beyond just being internally oriented. Korea was
able to successfull y follow the sequence from easy lSI to export substitution. It was
able to reduce and overcome some of its problems through learning-by-doing. As the
process evolved there were managerial improvements, technological adaptation, and
improvements in human capital. The increasing share of Korea's manufacturing exports, over time, reflect the government's conscious effort to promote exports (Amsden, 1989; Cypher & Dietz, 2004).
Peru also might have benefited from large amounts of development assistance over
the past 50 years, but its social indicators are very disappointing. Although education is
mandatory and UNESCO statistics show that 100% school enrollment has been
achieved, the average level of education is about third grade. The imbalance of economic growth and social development is what prompts us to label this "growth without
development." Peru provides a textbook case of a society in which the elite has not
been very supportive of human capital investment. As a result, Peru remains a profoundl y unequal society. While periods of primary-export booms generated wealth for
a small group, these elites were resistant to reinvesting the benefits of such bonanzas
(Moron & Sanborn, 2006).
Korea, on the other hand, has invested in improving the quality of education. High
quality education has improved the ability of its work force to perform effectively.
Recent studies indicate that Korea ranks high in the level of training and performance
of students in math and science, even higher than the United States and other developed countries. Data from the Organization of Economic Developmetn (OECD) (2011,
p. 129) indicate that Korea ranks fifth in the world in research spending as a percentage
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of GDP (3.36%) and is fourth in the world in the percentage of 24 year-olds with science degrees (OECD, 2009, p. 179). See Table 3. Many economists have emphasized
that technology is perhaps the single most important fac tor in generating growth and
spreading prosperity. Most LDCs, however, lag behind and do not have the technological capacity to increase productivity. The application of new techniques in the production process requires engineers and a work force with proper training, but this is in
short supply in many LDCs.
Another explanation of Peru's underperformance is the government's failure to
steer the economy in a more pragmatic development path by generating the proper
incentives. Most administrations did not have a clear plan or were unable to implement
one. Most if not all tolerated corruption, did not create an environment conducive to
investment, maintained a judicial system that was weak and ineffective, and devoted
little attention to developing a greater endogenous technological capacity. Peru's poor
ratings on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (Table 2) and
the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business (Table 2) make clear the government's failure to create a transparent, efficient system for business.
World Bank data indicate that countries that are more corrupt have much lower per
capita GDP. Peru's performance in this area has been much lower than Korea 's. Another problem is the weak judicial system, which in Peru 's case is of low quality and
not reliable. Lawsuits can take many years to be resolved . A good legal system facilitates contracts and protects private parties. Finally, the ease to do business is important.
In Peru formal businesses suffer from excessive red tape . This is one reason for the
existence of a large "informal" sector in Peru. The World Bank estimates that in Peru
starting a business takes 72 days and 32.5% of income per capita. This means that even
before a business is begun, a Peruvian entrepreneur must invest extensively with government bureaucracy.
Peru has the natural resources but lacks the administrative and productive capacity.
Present and former governments have lacked organizational autonomy, have managed
the economy poorly, and have lacked a clear long-term vision of national objectives.
They also failed to take advantage of crucial junctures and missed opportunities when
growth was in a boom cycle. Social inequality still hampers the electoral process, and
therefore, democracy itself. As Moron and Sanborn (2006) note, Peru has been hampered by a lack of clear objectives and the inability to implement a sustained development approach. Peru represents a paradox. Its economy has grown for much of the last
50 years. It has even entered an expansionary cycle for the past 15 years but has not
experienced a full recovery in that expansionary cycle. This means that there has been
some gain in employment opportunities and income inequality has only slightly improved. Today, in many respects, it is cheaper to import than to produce domestically
in Peru. This has, in some sense, generated a process of de-industrialization due to the
lack of proper incentives.
Can Peru realistically take advantage of globalization? De Rivero (200 1) recounts
how in 1967 he represented Peru in the Kennedy Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT). At the time Peru was a major producer
of copper, lead, zinc, fishmeal, cotton, and sugar. Twenty years later as a senior diplomat, he also took part in the Uruguay Round negotiations under GATT. But by then
trade negotiations centered on manufacturers with high technology content and trade in
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services. He notes that the content of Peru's exports had remained the same. With no
improvement in technological development, the country was virtually left sitting on the
sidelines of world trade negotiations.
What are, then, the possibilities of generating a cohesive collective project aimed
at increasing export capacity? Peru 's Ministry of Trade, for instance, was only created
in 2002 and it is only in recent years that Peru has signed free trade agreements with
the United States, China, and Canada. Peruvian authorities have invested more effort in
diplomacy rather than in studying how to compete in world markets. To this day there
is no strong desire or consensus in policy decision-making aimed at a sustained national development strategy. This is an important issue if a country like Peru is to drastically reduce poverty and become more prosperous.

Korea vs. Peru
Korea outperforms Peru on nearly every type of economic and social indicator. Over a
period of three decades Korea's economy grew at a rapid pace from year to year. Its
GDP grew from $2.3 billion in 1965 to $442 billion in 1997. Per capita income during
this period rose exponentially (Breen, 1999). Korea's per capita GDP is now three
times that of Peru' s. Lewis notes that "in 1970, Korea's GDP per capita was $2,500 in
today's dollars. In 1995 , it was $12,600, or five times higher. It took the U.S. almost a
hundred years (1857 -1954) to cover the same ground" (2004, p. 105). In 2003, Korea's
per capita GDP was over $15 ,000 (ADB, 2004) and in 2010 it had reached $29,000
(see Table 1). Tables 3a & b, which show the United Nation' s Human Development
Index, indicate that Korea outperforms Peru by a large margin, whether it is
agricultural productivity, life expectancy, education, research, and development, and in
the number of scientists and engineers. At the pace Korea was moving, it had reached
advanced country status by 1990. In 1996, Korea joined the Organization of Economic
Cooperation & Development (OECD), the club of high-income countries.
Industrialization can be funded by extractive resources (mineral and agricultural),
but resource-poor countries do not have this option, and must instead, as Ranis says,
"shift their attention to the development of their human resources" that is, emphasize
education and training to raise productivity ( 1996, p. 156). Korea was able to gradually
assimilate industrial and information technologies in the 1970s and 80s, but during
those years Peru 's economy stagnated (Ranis, 1990). The technological gap is evident
today. Tables 3a&b show that Korea spends much more on education, research and
development, and has an impressive number of scientists and engineers.

Ruben Berrios

121

Table 3a: Human Development Indicators

KOREA
PERU

Gini
Index

Agric productivity per
worker

Gross Domestic Investment
as % ofGDP

Genuine
Domestic
Saving as
% ofGDP

Adult
literacy
%

Mean yrs
of
schooling

1998
31.6
49.1
(2009)

2010
19,807
1,607

1990
38
21

1998
25.9
11.1

2007
1
9

2011
I 1.6
8.7

2010
29
25

Public
expenditure
on education
($billion)

2009
5

2.7

Table 3b: Human Development Indicators
Expenditure
on health as
% ofGDP

Life
expectancy

PCs
per

1000
people

R&D
expenditures
as % of
GDP

Scientists
& Engineers in R
&D

Motor
veh icles
per

HDI rank

1000
people

2009
KOREA
PERU

2000
73
69

5

2.7

2011
81.8
74

2000
405
41

2010
3.74
0.15
(2004)

2007
2,319
239

2009
267
41

2001
30
80

2011

15
80

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, various years; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook,
various years; The World Bank, 2012

Peru and Korea were at one time engaged in an easy import substitution strategy,
with emphasis on consumer goods geared for the domestic market. This required government intervention and entailed protecting infant industries, relying on overvalued
exchange rates, and maintaining low interest rates. Lacking the resource base Korea
was forced to export. Korea then successfully shifted toward easy export substitution,
exporting nondurable consumer goods. Raising exports accelerated the pace of industrialization. As Korean exports became more competitive it shifted to export promotion
by exporting more sophisticated manufactured goods that had a higher content of technology, particularly in engineering and electronics. This is evident in Table 4, which
shows the rapid growth of exports for Korea. Peru, on the other hand, tried to proceed
from easy lSI to secondary or vertical lSI, skipping export substitution and ran into
difficulties.

Table 4: External Orientation Ratios (Exports/GDP in %)
Colombia
Peru
Taiwan
Korea

1950
10.9
20.7
10. 1
2. 1

1960
15.7
24 .2
II. I
3 .3

1970
14.6
19.7
29.6
14.3

Source: IMF , Internation al Financial Statistics, various years

1980
16.3
22 .2
52.2
37.7

1990
18.9
12.5
60.6
40.7
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Korea's economic success has much to do with its institutions that encouraged
investment, the transfer of technology, industrialization, and trade. These institutions
include educational, political, judicial, and economic systems. A critical issue for
LDCs is how to enforce the rules for the market to operate more efficiently, ensuring
that contracts are upheld, individual property rights enforced, and that economic transactions are done in a transparent way. Without property rights there are no proper incentives to invest. Economists have also linked rapid economic growth to free and
open institutions that provide the right incentives.

Korea's Success Story
The Korea case helps us understand how a country can emerge from a group of poor
countries and become prosperous. During the 1960s Korea's approach was initially
state-led leading to a strong collaboration between business and government. The state
aggressively promoted exports through special incentives. Initially, labor-intensive
manufacturers dominated exports but later there was industrial diversification and
upgrading to make exports internationally more competitive (Amsden, 1989). Policy
choices taken by Korea were properly implemented, adequately monitored, and
achieved the desired results. In Korea subsequent administrations emphasized continuity in the po licy that was central to the export-led strategy. Price stability also helped
facilitate greater rates of saving and investment. The resulting outcome was an acceleration of economic growth and an increase in labor productivity in manufacturing (Lin,
1988).
Korea shows that rapid catch-up can be achieved through key ingredients to propel
growth. Aggressive trade-oriented policies and improved opportunities for investment
were important. Korea invested one-third of its GDP to achieve high rates of growth.
As Haggard ( 1990) puts it, Korea 's tum to export-led was "state-led." The state created
the supportive measures and mechanisms to work closely with the private sector. It
created credit incentives to exporters, provided technological assistance, and even
marketing (Amsdem, 1989; Bradford, 1986; Singh, 1993; Song, 1997).
The Korean government targeted "strategic" manufacturing industries. The plan
was based on the notion that government could accelerate development by nurturing
favored industries. In this sense, Korea has followed the Japanese model. An important
aspect of the policy was the protection of these industries from foreign competitionthe "infant" industry argument. The protection is needed because an infant industry is
not able to compete against imports from more developed countries.
The success of Korea is also partly due to U.S. assistance. The Korean War in the
early 1950s left a divided Korea. The outcome became a symbol of the Cold War. The
United States remained committed and aimed at turning South Korea into a modern
society based on the Western model. The United States sought success in Korea because it would prove to the world the superiority of its approach to development. According to Ekbladh, "by 1980, the Republic of Korea had received $6 billion in nonmilitary aid from the United States, and much of it during 20 years of intense effort in
South Korea between 1948 and 1965" (2004, p. 12). The United States played a key
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role in post-war relief and laid the foundation for nation building. Korea launched land
reform and an industrial development strategy.
The Vietnam War in the 1960s was a big boost for South Korea. General Park
Chung-hee committed two divisions of troops to fight in Vietnam alongside the Americans. The United States not only provided aid but it also awarded military contracts to
Korean chaebols (corporate conglomerates). During the peak of the war, 94% of Korean steel exports as well as a significant amount of machinery and chemicals went to the
United States (Ekbladh, 2004).
One factor often overlooked is that high rates of growth were achieved in a Korea
under an authoritarian, autocratic, and centralized rule. Washington was willing to
overlook this approach that marked succeeding regimes for three decades as long as it
could push its own agenda. The foundation of an export-oriented economy was laid by
the government of General Park Chung-hee, beginning with textiles and light industry.
He was determined to promote its heavy industry (steel, automobiles , ship -building,
and chemicals). First, he found willing partners in South Korea's business class and
then he attracted foreign direct investment, particularly from Japan. The government
also made strong efforts to create an attractive environment for foreign manufacturers
that made a significant contribution to the country's export growth. All of this, in conjunction with the appropriate economic policies, made it possible to pursue a more
aggressive development strategy.
By the late 60s, Korea had "graduated" and was no longer reliant on U.S. aid,
even if Korea continued to receive economic favors from the United States in the form
of loans and other guarantees (Stover, 1986). It was only in the 1980s that Korea
moved to democratic rule. Korea's success is partly attributed to American aid, a
strong authoritarian state that kept the lid on labor demands, and the extraordinary
perseverance and initiative of the Korean people.

Conclusion
Productivity is a measure of efficiency in the use of capital and labor resources in the
production process. Productivity is critical to a country's international competitiveness
and its standard of living. Increasing productivity and efficiency can be achieved
through human resource development by enhancing the skills and education of the
labor force, investing in physical capital, improving management and organizational
techniques, and upgrading the domestic technological capability. In addition, there also
must be institutional improvements as well as the promotion of a capital market and of
trade policies, adequate management of macroeconomic policies, and a stable
government.
Korea belongs to a small group of countries that have achieved spectacular success
in expanding manufactured exports since the 1960s. Peru, on the other hand, has run
into difficulties . Korea was able to move quickly from the simple type of manufacturing to a more capital-intensive method and with greater technological content to spearhead rapid industrialization (Amden, 1989; La! & Myint, 1996). This process was more
difficult in Peru because of erratic political development, inappropriate macroeconomic
policies, and weak institutions.
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Over the past five decades Peru has lacked political continuity and the correct
policy reforms to propel the economy to sustained growth. Explanations of Korea's
success lie mainly on the adoption of a coherent strategy of promoting growth industries, economic and technological planning, strong support for education, investment
incentives, industrial restructuring, and the strong push for manufactured exports. An
important difference with a country like Peru, which experienced faltering growth, was
macroeconomic management (Sachs, 2005 ; Lin, 1988; Ranis, 1996; Singh, 1993). This
implies lack of macroeconomic discipline, and above all, policy continuity. Peru's
macroeconomic pol icy shifted between strong state intervention and economic liberalism depending on which government was in office.
Explanations on Korea 's success have often emphasized its free market-oriented
policies stressing private sector development and its outward-oriented strategy. But
what is often overlooked is the government-led push for growth. The Korean government implemented an lSI strategy using high levels of protection but soon switched to
export promotion. The government assisted in the process, subsidized credit, provided
tax incentives, and depreciated its currency. Much of Latin America, on the other hand,
was more concerned with lSI than with export promotion.
Other explanations stress the socio-cultural factors such as the Confucian values:
strong work ethic, loyalty, self-discipline of the labor force, and thriftiness (Koo,
1992). The political explanation stresses the presence of a strong autocratic state that
provided a stable environment as well as the role of government intervention to shape
policies. Finally, U.S. economic assistance to Korea in the form of credits and facilitating its market to Korean exports also played an important role.
Peru's development conundrum has been its inability to maintain sustained economic growth. Peru's economy still suffers from structural weaknesses. Peru has had
spurts of growth but this has been mainly resource-oriented. A constant problem has
been its enduring poverty and inequality as well as high levels of corruption. This remains the main contradiction, that Peru is a country rich in natural resources but faces
so much human misery. Various studies on development remind us that widespread
poverty, inequality, and corruption are a drag on growth and development. In terms of
management, many have voiced that Peru is a country without direction, no planning to
speak of, and the government and its people seem to be "disengaged" (Schuldt, 2005).
Sustained development bas much to do with maintaining economic discipline, creating
the right incentives and maintaining policy continuity, generating political and judicial
reform, having an active social policy, and promoting investor confidence.
Peru 's economy bas remained dependent on an erratic course of traditional exports. The industrial sector has lacked competitive strength due to high costs, technological weakness, and lack of skilled labor (Sheahan, 1999). Although nontraditional
exports have risen in recent years, the industrial sector has been slow in raising productivity and has not achieved much capacity to compete in global markets. As long as
governments in office remain mainly concerned with short-term solutions to long-term
problems, Peru will continue to face stumbling blocks. The country still lacks a viable
development model and a coherent trade strategy to compete globally. Korea's success
serves as a meaningful lesson that its path to development has much to teach about
failed policies in countries like Peru.
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